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(Clark and Thornton, 1997). In this earlier 
paper, Clark and Thornton showed how 
trading achieved representations against 
computational search could allow to eas-
ily solve problems that seemed intractable 
without some recoding of the incoming 
information. Perruchet and Vinter gener-
alized this approach, and posited the for-
mation of representations isomorphic to 
the world structure as the ultimate ques-
tion that cognitive sciences have to address. 
Crucially, they postulated from the outset 
that all mental representations are con-
scious, on the basis of a twofold considera-
tion. On the one hand, everyone knows that 
at least some mental events are conscious, 
because we have direct and personal evi-
dence of their existence. Even those who 
argue that consciousness is epiphenomenal 
cannot reject this assessment. On the other 
hand, the existence of an unconscious men-
tal life is a postulate or a presupposition, 
given that we have, by definition, no direct 
proof of an unconscious counterpart to our 
conscious mental life. It emerges from these 
two simple premises that, in striking con-
tradiction with a widespread view among 
cognitive scientists, a framework relying 
exclusively on the representations and the 
mental operations we are aware of are more 
parsimonious than accounts postulating, in 
addition, a parallel cognitive apparatus. It 
is worth adding that exclusively relying on 
the conscious/attentional system brings out 
important functional constraints on the 
available explanatory tools, such as limited 
capacity, seriality of processing, and quick 
forgetting.
The approach outlined by Perruchet and 
Vinter (2002) meets the desired objective of 
accounting for conscious representations 
(roughly) isomorphic to the world struc-
ture thanks to the power of self-organizing 
principles. The progressive organization of 
A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated 
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
The “hierarchical prediction machine” 
approach proposed by Clark shares with 
the standard computationalism the pos-
tulate of a powerful cognitive unconscious 
that “does the job.” All the possible options 
about the current percept are assumed to be 
computed and ordered as a function of their 
probability outside of any conscious experi-
ence, and, as we understand the approach, 
conscious thought is nothing else as the pas-
sive recipient of the ready-to-use end-result 
of the computation of multiple probability 
distributions.
The postulate of a smart cognitive 
unconscious is so deeply ingrained in our 
modern culture that it is taken for granted 
by most people. As a consequence, assum-
ing the computation of multiple prob-
ability density distributions, keeping alive 
multiple options about the world, does not 
appear as less plausible than, say, imagin-
ing, in a Chomskyan framework, that the 
mind makes assumptions about the prop-
erties of the ambient language and tests 
hypotheses in order to set parameters of 
a Universal Grammar at their appropriate 
values. In both cases, consciousness appears 
as a supernumerary issue, something like 
the piece left over once the puzzle has been 
completed. In this regard, the place where 
the issue of consciousness is dealt with in 
the Clark’s target paper, i.e., near of the end, 
is revealing.
Of course, there is no formal incon-
sistency in this view of the mind, as Clark 
argued. His subsequent claim that this view 
would illuminate the question of the con-
tent of our subjective experiences is more 
disputable. The reported example is the 
case of delusions and hallucinations in 
schizophrenia. Without undermining the 
importance of that issue, our feeling is that 
the questions emerging when the issue of 
the content of phenomenal experiences is 
put forward are primarily related to daily 
life and commonplace events. But our dis-
satisfaction with the place allocated to the 
issue of consciousness is much deeper. Our 
view is that, once the familiarity with the 
current cognitivist landscape has been put 
aside, the computational account of the 
mind, including the Bayesian approach, is 
singularly awkward. This account postulates 
an unconscious device endowed with extra 
powerful computational tools, whereas 
our conscious mental life would be con-
demned, for some mysterious reasons, to 
rely laboriously on far more limited capaci-
ties. Where is the mischievous sprite that 
prevents us from gaining deliberate access 
to the marvelous device that advocates of a 
Bayesian brain and other cognitive scientists 
imagine?
Clark is aware that postulating very 
sophisticated unconscious computations 
may be somewhat implausible, as revealed 
by the repeated mention that simpler 
mechanisms could act “as if” sophisticated 
operations were carried out. This is indeed 
an attractive solution, but the lack of con-
crete illustrations of how this could work, 
and the indeterminacy regarding how far 
these alternative mechanisms can go on 
the way of simplification, leaves the reader 
somewhat frustrated in this respect.
Another general model of the mind, 
presented 10 years ago in BBS (Perruchet 
and Vinter, 2002), proposed a much more 
radical departure with regard to the conven-
tional cognitive framework. Paradoxically, 
this alternative approach found its origin 
in an earlier Clark’s contribution to BBS 
Is consciousness a passive recipient of the end-product of 
sophisticated unconscious computations?
Pierre Perruchet* and Bénédicte Poulin-Charronnat
Laboratoire d’Etude de l’Apprentissage et du Développement/Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Université de Bourgogne, Dijon, France
*Correspondence: pierre.perruchet@u-bourgogne.fr
Edited by:
Axel Cleeremans, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Reviewed by:
Shimon Edelman, Cornell University, USA
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 413 | 1
General Commentary
published: 22 October 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00413
RefeRences
Clark, A., and Thornton, C. (1997). Trading spaces: 
computation, representation, and the limits of unin-
formed learning. Behav. Brain Sci. 20, 57–90.
Perruchet, P., and Vinter, A. (2002). The self-organizing 
consciousness. Behav. Brain Sci. 25, 297–388.
Received: 31 August 2012; accepted: 30 September 2012; 
published online: 22 October 2012.
Citation: Perruchet P and Poulin-Charronnat B (2012) 
Is consciousness a passive recipient of the end-product of 
sophisticated unconscious computations? Front. Psychology 
3:413. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00413
This article was submitted to Frontiers in Theoretical 
and Philosophical Psychology, a specialty of Frontiers in 
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Perruchet and Poulin-Charronnat. This 
is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, 
distribution and reproduction in other forums, provided the 
original authors and source are credited and subject to any 
copyright notices concerning any third-party graphics etc.
the mind is assumed to emerge through 
elementary associative processes that take 
the conscious representations themselves 
as the stuff on which they operate, a gen-
eral process that was summarized in the 
concept of self-organizing consciousness 
(SOC). The SOC model shares with the 
recent Clark’s proposal a number of attrac-
tive features, such as bringing cognition, 
perception, and attention together within 
a unified framework. The SOC model is 
also based on the interplay of top-down 
and bottom-up influences: The nature of 
the processing primitives determines how 
the world is perceived and the nature of 
the world determines the transformation 
of the processing primitives, and so on, 
recursively, in line with a developmental 
principle initially described by Piaget’s 
concepts of assimilation and accommoda-
tion. Finally, the SOC model also accounts 
for the human high responsiveness to the 
statistical structure of our environment. 
Admittedly, this model is less developed 
and polished than the hierarchical predic-
tion machine described by Clark, especially 
with regard to its possible implementation 
within the neural machinery. However, as 
an outline of a further full-blown model, 
the Perruchet and Vinter’s proposal has, 
in our view, the crucial advantage of 
accounting for mental life without any call 
for unconscious computations, making it 
closer to the “neats” than to the “scruff-
ies” in a more obvious way than Clark’s 
proposal.
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